This paper investigates the impact of communication in a public good game with a central authority. The central authority includes a fixed cost that increases with the level of monitoring which in turn determines the level of deterrence. The level of monitoring is both exogenously and endogenously determined. Across three treatments subjects either have no opportunity to communicate, communicate only when the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed, or communicate only when the level of monitoring is endogenously selected. Results suggest that, in both treatments, average earnings are significantly higher with the opportunity to communicate. Most significantly, with the opportunity to communicate prior to endogenous selection, groups practically eliminate monitoring (imposing a low cost, nondeterrent, central authority), while maintaining a high level of contributions. Communication appears to make groups less dependent on institutional deterrence and allows them to reduce the costs of central authority.
INTRODUCTION
Surprisingly, given the ubiquity and scale of central authority regimes in modern societies, little is known about how the opportunity to communicate might impact their effectiveness. Central authority institutions monitor behavior and enforce established rules. The rules, established through a political process, specify which behavior warrants sanction and the level of the punishment. Whether or not individuals have an incentive to alter their behavior depends on the probability that a violation is observed and on the magnitude of punishment. The central authority is said to be deterrent when the expected cost of a violation is greater than the expected benefit (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1996; Polinsky and Shavell, 1979; Stigler, 1970) .
In public good games (PGGs), greater deterrence has been shown to significantly increase contributions (Kamei et al., 2015; Markussen et al., 2013; Tyran and Feld, 2006) . 1 As discussed below, in the central authority described here, there exists a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism outside of the group. In stark contrast, one can consider a peer punishment mechanism that allows subjects to impose a fine, for a fee, on other group members after observing their behavior. 2 Since the pioneering work of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues, a significant amount of research has been dedicated to investigating the effectiveness of peer punishment within social dilemmas (Ostrom et al., 1992) . In the common pool resource (CPR) games devised by Ostrom et al., peer punishment enhanced cooperation; however, once the costs of punishment were accounted for, overall earnings were lower than in the "no-punishment" condition (Ostrom et al., 1992) .
Within the linear public goods literature it has been shown that the induced level of cooperation can be sufficient to overcome the cost of punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008; Chaudhuri, 2011) . 3 However, like Ostrom et al. (1992) it is not uncommon to observe the benefits of peer punishment be negated by excessive, misplaced, or anti-social punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008) . Subjects in PGGs appear to recognize this and when given the opportunity to determine who among them can be punished, groups never allow the punishment of high contributors (Ertan et al., 2009) . Overall, the literature suggests that the positive impacts of peer punishment are not robust and are unlikely to solve complex social dilemmas observed in the field.
Relative to peer punishment mechanisms, central authority institutions have both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that the rules can remove the possibility that cooperative behavior is punished. Just as is the case with peer punishment, when given the opportunity to vote on the parameters of a central 1 Social scientists have long studied behavior in PGGs to understand cooperation. The incentives in linear PGGs pose a social dilemma where individual self-interest conflicts with group welfare. Each individual has an incentive to free-ride, but it is in the interest of the group for everyone to contribute their entire endowment. The public goods literature has established that initial contributions are roughly half of one's endowment and that contributions decline with repetition (Davis and Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995) . 2 Note that several intermediary institutions, between the central authority described here and peer punishment, have been investigated. For example, groups may delegate decision authority so that one group member makes contribution decisions on the groups' behalf (Hamman et al., 2011) or groups may cede the authority to punish to a single group member (Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011) . 3 The interior-solution CPR games employed by Ostrom et al. are more complex than linear PGGs, but research suggests that behavior is similar across payoff equivalent, strategically symmetric, CPR and PG games (Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud, 2006; Kingsley and Liu, 2014; Kingsley, 2015 Our main contribution is to investigate the impact of communication when the level of monitoring is endogenously selected. With the opportunity to communicate groups practically eliminate monitoring (self-imposing a low cost, non-deterrent, central authority) while maintaining cooperation. In contrast, in the absence of communication, groups maintain cooperation by self-imposing a costly, deterrent, central authority. Overall, average earnings are significantly higher with communication than without.
Analysis of the chat transcripts suggests that coordination of an unanimous agreement to cooperate underlies the effectiveness of communication. We speculate that allowing groups to discuss the social dilemma may enable them to develop Horizontal Trust among themselves in a way consistent with the social connectedness that builds social capital (Coleman, 1993; Putnam, 1995; Scholz and Lubell, 1998) . Social capital is thought to constrain self-interest, reducing the cost of monitoring and enforcing contracts making groups less dependent on formal institutions. Here, communication makes groups less dependent on costly, institutional deterrence. This allows groups to benefit from the rules-based central authority while mitigating the fixed costs associated with it.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Each treatment consisted of 25 periods broken into three phases. Instructions were distributed at the beginning of each phase and required subjects to correctly answer a set of comprehension questions before the experiment would continue.
6 Groups of five subjects were randomly formed and maintained for all 25 periods. Phase 1 (periods 1-3) introduced a standard linear public good with the following payoffs:
where e = 20 was the subject's endowment, x i the subject's contribution, and α = 0.4 the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the group account. With α < 1 < nα and a known last period, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which every subject free-rides, but group earnings are maximized only when every subject contributes their entire endowment.
In phases 2 and 3, a central authority was introduced with the following payoffs:
where the expected number of subjects monitored, z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, determined the probability of being observed, p = z/n. This probability was independent for each group member. The fixed cost to monitor a single group member, m = 5, was distributed across all group members, so that each of the five group members paid 1 Experimental Dollar (ED) for each member expected to be monitored. For example, if z = 2, then each group member paid 2 EDs and faced a 40% chance of having their contribution monitored.
The level of the sanction, s = 1, was held constant, such that a group member who was monitored would be punished according to how many EDs remained in their private account, (e − x i ). A participant who contributed their entire endowment could not be punished (i.e. even if monitored, 1 × (20 − 20) = 0), while a freerider may not be punished in the event that their contribution was not observed. To illustrate, consider again the speed limit example. A driver obeying the speed limit may very well be observed by the police but will pay no fine while a speeding driver may also avoid paying a fine if the behavior is not observed by the police.
With s, n, and α held constant, solving the first-order condition with respect to x i expresses the relationship between the expected cost of free-riding, ps, and the benefit, 1 − α. Solving for z, reveals that the expected cost is greater than or equal to the benefit (and assuming risk aversion that the institution is deterrent) when z ∈ {3, 4, 5}. Similarly, when z ∈ {1, 2} the institution is non-deterrent, and at z = 0 no institution is implemented.
In phase 2 (periods 4-15), in all treatments, each level of monitoring, z, was exogenously imposed in two cycles.
7 Prior to making their contribution decisions each subject was informed about the expected number of group members to be monitored (z). In each phase 3 period (periods [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , in all treatments, the monitoring level was endogenously determined. Subjects voted individually for their preferred level of monitoring and the median of their 5 votes was implemented during that period. 8 Once determined, the level of monitoring was reported to each subject prior to their contribution decision, just as in phase 2.
The only manipulation across treatments was whether, and if so when, groups were able to communicate. Communication took the form of open-ended anonymous chat-room discussions. They were told that they could discuss the decision they faced within the experiment. Each chat-room discussion lasted up 7 Each level of monitoring was imposed randomly within each group without replacement through periods 4-9 and again through periods 10-15. 8 The median level of monitoring was imposed because it is less sensitive to strategic voting. For example, if the average of the vote were imposed then group members would be able to manipulate the outcome more easily by voting for more or less than their preferred level of monitoring. to one minute although if all group members agreed they were able to exit the chatroom early.
9 They were not allowed to identify themselves, use offensive language, or make threats of any kind.
In our baseline treatment, referred to as NoComm, no communication was allowed at any time and the game proceeded just as described above. 10 The second treatment, referred to as Phase2Comm, allowed group members to communicate before making their contribution decisions during phase 2 (when the level of monitoring was exogenously imposed). All other aspects of Phase2Comm were identical to NoComm. Therefore, during phase 3 of Phase2Comm subjects voted on the level of monitoring without the opportunity to communicate.
The third treatment, referred to as Phase3Comm, allowed group members to communicate before voting on the level of monitoring during phase 3 (when the level of monitoring was endogenously determined). Immediately after the discussion ended, each group member would vote for their preferred level of monitoring just as subjects in the other treatments did. For all periods through the end of phase 2, Phase3Comm and NoComm were identical.
Hypotheses
Communication is thought to promote cooperation within social dilemmas by either fostering group identity or eliciting credible commitments (Mendelberg, 2002; Bicchieri, 2002) . Fostering group identity suggests that through communication subjects effectively internalize the groups' welfare as their own. In the context of PGGs this implies that subjects prefer to contribute because doing so increases group earnings. Support for the group identity mechanism stems from research suggesting that communication enhances cooperation only when the group unanimously agrees, suggesting that it is the commitment to group identity that alters behavior (Orbell et al., 1988) . Other researchers question the importance of group identity and focus on the capacity of communication to elicit credible commitments to cooperate (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994) . For example, fostering group identity, by itself, did not enhance cooperation but communication concerning the social dilemma promoted cooperation by creating a perceived consensus to cooperate (Bouas and Komorita, 1996) .
Understanding the impact of communication is important because behavior, within the context of central authority regimes, has been shown to depend not only on the objective level of deterrence. Research suggests that trust, both in government and in others, significantly increases tax compliance (Scholz and Lubell, 1998) . Of particular interest here is what Scholz and Lubell (1998) refer to as Horizontal Trust or, trust among citizens. Scholz and Lubell (1998) use American tax return data, tax policies, and surveys to examine taxpayers' behaviors and perceptions. They measured how citizens' subjective perceptions of the threat of being audited as well as their sense of duty (i.e. group identity (Scholz and Pinney, 1995) ) determined taxpaying behaviors. Their research suggests that individuals' perceptions of monitoring probability were inflated by a sense of obligation to the group that was associated with greater trust among citizens.
The argument in this literature is that trust among citizens can reduce the need for costly monitoring and punishment. In a broader context, the horizontal trust provided by communication may enable groups to build social capital. Social capital captures the stock of social norms, networks of civic engagement, and the trustworthiness that defines a society or group (Coleman, 1993) . Social capital is thought to constrain self-interest, reducing the cost of monitoring and enforcing contracts making groups less dependent on formal institutions. Communication may therefore underlie the trust and social connectedness that allows groups to sustain cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1995) .
Hypothesis 1 With the opportunity to communicate, average contributions will be greater when the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed.
During phase 2, the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed. The only decision made by subjects is how much of one's endowment to contribute. Groups in linear PGGs, even in the absence of any institutional constraints on behavior, successfully maintained cooperation when allowed to communicate (Bochet et al., 2006) .
Hypothesis 2 With the opportunity to communicate, the average level of monitoring will be lower when the level of monitoring is endogenously selected.
Our second hypothesis represents our main contribution. During phase 3, the level of monitoring is endogenously selected. Welfare improving cooperation requires that groups agree to limit the level of monitoring while maintaining a high level of contributions.
RESULTS
One hundred five subjects (21 groups of 5) participated in the experiment with 8 groups in NoComm, 6 in Phase2Comm, and 7 in Phase3Comm. 
Communication and Exogenous Deterrence
In this section, we report on hypothesis 1 by comparing average contributions, within the phase 2 periods, across treatments. Recall that through phase 2 the NoComm and Phase3Comm treatments were identical. Not surprisingly, average contributions (NoComm v. Phase3Comm) are statistically indistinguishable overall: 13.70 vs. 14.64 (WRS: p = 0.36). Therefore, in what follows, the data is analyzed across Phase2Comm and the pooled (NoComm and Phase3Comm) data. 13 Our first result supports hypothesis 1.
Result 1 The opportunity to communicate significantly increases average contributions overall and at each level of monitoring during phase 2 (when the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed).
Figure 1 displays the average contributions in phase 2 at each level of monitoring. Average contributions are significantly higher, without regard to the level of monitoring, with communication (Phase2Comm) than without communication 11 The NoComm data was collected at the same laboratory in December 2013. Despite the lag behavior in phase 1, where all treatments are identical, is equivalent. 12 Throughout, all Kruskill-Wallis (KW) and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (WRS) tests are conducted at the group level providing 8, 6, and 7 independent observations across NoComm, Phase2Comm, and Phase3Comm, respectively. All reported p-values are two-sided. 13 No significant difference in average contributions, across the NoComm and Phase3Comm phase 2 periods, is observed at any level of monitoring. Results treating the NoComm and Phase3Comm data separately are equivalent to those presented. All results are available upon request (Kingsley, 2017 These non-parametric results are confirmed in the subject random effect model presented in Table 2 . The dependent variable is the observed contribution for each subject. The independent variables include the level of imposed monitoring, z, interacted with the an indicator for Phase2Comm. The model also controls for time effects (period) and for the average group contribution on the previous period. The error terms are clustered at the group level to allow correlation within groups but not across.
Both period and previous group contribution are negative suggesting that contributions tend to decrease across periods and in response to the declining contributions of the group. The marginal effects of communication at each level of monitoring are reported in Table 2 . Results suggest that at each level of monitoring communication significantly increases contributions.
The increase in contributions observed in Phase2Comm is sufficiently large to significantly increase average phase 2 earnings: 35.72 vs. 29.90 (WRS: p < 0.01). These results suggest that communication allows groups to successfully coordinate on a welfare improving increase in contributions when the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed.
Communication and Endogenous Deterrence
In this section, we report on hypothesis 2 by comparing the average level of self-imposed monitoring, within the phase 3 periods, across NoComm and Phase3Comm. Our second result supports hypothesis 2. 
Result 2 The opportunity to communicate significantly lowers the average level of self-imposed monitoring during phase 3 (when the level of monitoring is endogenously selected).
Groups in NoComm, on average, self-impose a deterrent central authority where 3.65 group members are expected to be monitored. On the other hand, groups in Phase3Comm, on average, self-impose a non-deterrent central authority where only 0.57 group members are expected to be monitored. This difference is statistically significant (WRS: p < 0.01). Again, these results are confirmed in a subject random effect model with the error terms clustered at the group level. In Table 3 , the dependent variable is the subject's choice of monitoring level. The model includes an indicator variable for the Phase3Comm treatment, controls for time effects (period), and the average group contribution on the previous period. Results suggests that the opportunity to communicate enables groups to significantly reduce the level of monitoring. The average group contribution in the previous period is negative and significant suggesting that as average contributions increase groups tend to reduce monitoring. Importantly, average contributions (NoComm vs. Phase3Comm) are statistically indistinguishable: 17.05 vs. 17.36 (WRS: p = 0.64)). In the absence of communication, groups willingly self-impose a deterrent level of monitoring. Doing so enables them to maintain high contributions but is costly. With communication, groups are able to coordinate the reduction of costly monitoring to non-deterrent levels while maintaining equivalently high contributions. As a result, average earnings during the phase 3 periods in Phase3Comm are significantly greater than those observed in NoComm: 36.60 vs. 32.12 (WRS: p = 0.03). 
Analysis of Communication
Transcripts of the chat discussions allow us to investigate the underlying, although non-causal, mechanisms leading to cooperation. Using the literature as a guide, chat categories (discussed below) were created to capture the prominent mechanisms thought to enhance cooperation. Once the chat codes were created, two undergraduate students were recruited to independently analyze the chat transcripts. They were asked to look at each group-period as a single observation and to determine which of the provided categories the discussion fit best. To obtain a conservative estimate, chat categories were only deemed "present" if both coders independently agreed.
16
In our analysis only 6 chat categories were prevalent, the others were either never coded or were only observed during one group-period discussion (Table 4) . Here, we summarize the most prevalent chat categories. Leadership implies that a group member proposed a specific course of action and was able to elicit positive responses from each group member. Importantly, this suggests that the agreement was unanimous. Following recent research investigating strategic thinking within PGGs we code Leadership as time-invariant (Cox and Stoddard, 2017) . That is, if unanimous agreement was reached we assumed that it had long lasting effects imposed monitoring (1.33 vs. 0.57 (WRS: p = 0.35)), average contributions (16.21 vs. 17.36 (WRS: p = 0.94)), or average earnings (34.12 vs. 36.60 (WRS: p = 0.52)). Relative to NoComm: we find that groups self-impose significantly less monitoring (3.65 vs. 1.33 (WRS: p = 0.02)) while maintaining an equivalent level of contributions (17.04 vs. 16.21 (WRS: p = 0.70)). However, there is no significant increase earnings (32.12 vs. 34.12 (WRS: p = 0.52). 16 Each category, for each discussion, was given a score of zero (not present) or one (present). Mean percategory coder agreement: 98.86%; mean per-category Cohen's κ: 0.68. Chat codes were not mutually exclusive so that each group-period discussion could be coded with multiple categories. Instructions and the full list of chat categories provided to the students are provided in the appendix. and coded Leadership as present for all periods within the relevant group. 17 On the other hand, Commitment suggests that group members signaled a willingness to cooperate but there lacked a leader and/or unanimous consensus. We code these as contemporaneous implying that such discussions have, if any, short lived effects on behavior. Pro-Social/Group Identity captures the idea that group members appear to interpret the incentives from the groups' perspective. That is, rather than behave in their own self-interest the group expresses a desire to behave in the group's interest.
The Morale/Congrats category suggests that group members expressed positive statements concerning previous cooperation. Similarly, the Anger/Frustration/Threats category suggests that group members expressed negative statements concerning previous behavior. As the name suggests, the Explaining Correct category means that group members correctly discussed the incentives within the game.
To investigate the relationship between the content of group discussions and behavior, two random effect models are presented. For the Phase2Comm (Phase3Comm) data the dependent variable is the average group contribution (average level of monitoring). Both models include the 6 relevant chat categories, control for time effects (period), and the average group contribution on the previous period. Additionally, the Phase2Comm model includes the level of monitoring as a control. Recall that the unit of observation for each chat-code is a group-period; as such, there are 72 and 70 observations in Phase2Comm 17 Leadership was coded for 2 of the 6 groups in Phase2Comm (33%) and for 2 of the 7 groups in Phase3Comm (29% and Phase3Comm, respectively. Group random effects are used to account for the repeated observations at the group level.
Column (1) in Table 5 displays the results for the Phase2Comm data. The only chat category that is significant is Leadership suggesting that groups benefiting from coordinated, unanimous agreement, contribute significantly more. Period is negative suggesting that contributions tend to decrease over time. As expected, contributions rise with the level of monitoring. Column (2) in Table 5 displays the results for the Phase3Comm data. In this case, Leadership and Commitment both reduce the average level of monitoring. Also, when the incentives within the game were correctly explained, groups tended to increase the level of monitoring. Last, there is an inverse relationship between the average contribution in previous periods and the level of monitoring.
In summary, the impact of communication is consistent with the related literature. Communication is effective when groups perceive that a consensus to cooperation has been established (Bouas and Komorita, 1996) . Leadership has a robust and positive relationship with cooperation in both models suggesting that of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2017.33 unanimity is important (Orbell et al., 1988) . On the other hand, Commitment has a positive relationship with cooperation only in Phase3Comm suggesting that non-unanimous, more contemporaneous, signals of commitment have less effect on what groups perceive as consensus. Further, it does not appear that group identity, by itself, has a significant effect on cooperation. The Pro-Social/Group Identity category is insignificant in both treatments.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the central authority investigated here, the deterrence is manipulated by altering the probability that the central authority observes a subject's contribution. The magnitude of punishment is held constant so that the fixed cost of the central authority increases with the level of deterrence. Thus, there is an incentive to maintain cooperation at low levels of deterrence in order to reduce the fixed cost of the central authority.
When given the opportunity to communicate groups are able to coordinate and commit to welfare improving behavior. When the level of monitoring is endogenously selected, communication allows groups to practically eliminate monitoring. In contrast, without the opportunity to communicate groups willingly self-impose a deterrent level of monitoring. Groups in both treatments induce and maintain cooperative levels of contributions. However, by significantly lowering the level of costly monitoring groups with the opportunity to communicate earn significantly more.
Analysis of the chat transcripts suggests that leadership and the coordination of unanimous agreement to cooperate underlie the effectiveness of communication. This is important as it suggests communication is one way that groups, and societies, can benefit from a rules-based central authority while mitigating the fixed costs associated with it.
Recall that one advantage of central authority is that it avoids the potentially anti-social punishment associated with peer punishment (Herrmann et al., 2008) . However, the disadvantage is that regardless of behavior, central authority regimes impose a cost on the group. By effectively eliminating monitoring while maintaining cooperation, communication makes the groups less dependent on institutional deterrence. This is consistent with literature suggesting that social capital makes societies less dependent on formal institutions to induce cooperation (Coleman, 1993) . Specifically, communication may enable groups to develop Horizontal Trust among themselves in a way consistent with the social connectedness that builds social capital (Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Putnam, 1995 r Group Optimal Group members incorrectly believe that it is in their own self-interest to allocate 20 conditional on positive allocations from other group members. The group members do not understand (or at least express an understanding) that it is in their self-individual interest to keep their EDs.
r Go Big
Group members state that they should allocate 20 for the heck of it without any rationale or that they should monitor 0 or 5. They appear to focus on the endpoints without a particular reason.
r Future Group members discuss strategy heading into future periods implying a concern for maintaining cooperation. Groups members state that continuing to contribute in current periods will encourage contributions in future periods: Lets keep contributing, if we start putting in 0 everyone will and we will not make money or everyone keep putting in 20, dont start being cheap now.
r End Game Group members state a belief that as they approach the end of game behavior might change, typically towards contributing less: The game is almost over, lets keep putting in 20.
r No Chat Nothing was discussed.
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